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American philosopher Wilfrid Sellars (1962) once said that “the aim of philosophy, abstractly 
formulated, is to understand how things in the broadest possible sense hang together in the broadest 
possible sense.” My main question is this: within the context of contemporary sustainability 
science, how does the concept of ‘sustainability’ in the broadest possible sense of the concept hang 
together in the broadest possible sense?1 I will answer this question by advancing two new 
explicative definitions of sustainability that jointly constitute a unifying concept of sustainability. 
This meta-level concept accommodates most of the central meanings conventionally assigned to 
‘sustainability’ by sustainability scientists and scholars, offers a useful division of labor between 
scientists and scholars, and makes explicit value judgements commonly associated with the 
concept of sustainability. 
 
1. Sustainability is Polysemous  
 
While political philosophers have generally taken ‘sustainability’ to be a matter of 
intergenerational justice,2 environmental philosophers, including Sahotra Sarkar (2012) and Bryan 
G. Norton (2005), have long recognized that whatever ‘sustainability’ is, it is a thick concept — 
one that combines evaluative and non-evaluative elements.3 To claim that something is sustainable 
is not merely to describe it as possessing certain features, characteristics, or qualities but to make 
a value judgement about the comparative goodness of the thing—typically a state of affairs—in 
question. Invariably, a sustainable state of affairs is one that is desirable or good in some way, 
even if there remains wide-ranging disagreement about what makes it so.4 Certainly, no 
sustainability scientist would claim that it is bad for the Earth or parts of the Earth to be sustainable, 
 
1 Sustainability science is as “an emerging field of research dealing with the interactions between natural and social 
systems, and with how those interactions affect the challenge of sustainability: meeting the needs of present and future 
generations while substantially reducing poverty and conserving the planet’s life support systems” (Kates 2011, 
19449). 
2 This literature includes Dobson (1998), Page (1999), Gardiner (2006), and Habib (2013). 
3 The term ‘thick concept’ was originally coined by Bernard Williams (1985, 140-3). 
4 This observation may pose a challenge for anyone wishing to defend a value-free ideal for sustainability science 
(Nagatsu et al. 2020; Minteer 2016). 
even if they disagree on what the concept of sustainability means or denotes. This entanglement 
of normative and descriptive elements pervades every major conception of ‘sustainability.’ 
Consider, for instance, the tripartite Venn diagram, made famous by the 2005 UN World 
Summit, and the three concentric circles endorsed by many ecological economists. The Venn 
diagram, depicted in Figure 1, appears to suggest that whatever sustainability is, it is located where 
the so-called ‘three Es’ (environment, equity, and economics) coincide. Figure 2, by contrast, 
depicts a series of concentric circles, the environment, society, and the economy. On this latter 
conception, the environment is seen as the foundation of sustainability, with society and the 
economic system embedded within it (Caradonna 2014). While these two models lack precision, 
are notoriously ambiguous, and admit a large number of mutually incompatible definitions of 
sustainability, no sustainability scientist or scholar denies that sustainability is something desirable 




























Figure 2. The Embedded Economy 
 
Beyond these renowned images, the most famous definition of sustainability (sustainable 
development) is due to the World Commission on Environment and Development’s (1987) Our 
Common Future, also known as the Brundtland Report. On this account, sustainable development 
is “development which meets the needs of current generations without compromising the ability 





Figure 1. The 
















who matters – members of the present and future generations – but what matters, too: the ability 
for these intergenerational subjects to meet their own basic needs. 
Motivated by the Brundtland Report’s definition, the so-called social scientific approach5 
to sustainability was pioneered by resource economists, including Robert M. Solow (1986, 1993) 
and David Pearce et al. (1989). On this approach, the Nobel-Prize winning economist, Kenneth 
Arrow et al. (2004, 2010), shows that a sustainable economy provides the current standard of living 
across generations as long as each generation bequeaths to its successor at least as large a quantity 
of an economy’s ‘productive base,’ which is composed of three kinds of capital assets: human, 
natural, and manufactured capital.6 More specifically, Arrow et al. (2010) show that inter-temporal 
social welfare, V(t), is sustainable if and only if this variable is equal to or greater than zero over 
time (dV/dt ≥ 0). Unlike the Brundtland Report’s definition of sustainable development, which 
focuses on meeting basic needs, resource economists maintain that an economic system is 
sustainable if and only if human well-being (qua preference satisfactionism) is non-declining over 
time. 
Finally, another dominant conception of ‘sustainability’ is the so-called “The Resilience 
Paradigm,” which was originally inspired by the earlier work of Donella Meadows et al.’s The 
Limits to Growth (1972) and Lance H. Gunderson and C.S. Holling’s Panarchy (2002).7 On this 
view, a given system – whether social-ecological, coupled human-natural, or complex adaptive – 
is sustainable insofar as the system is ‘resilient’ or capable of withstanding internal and external 
threats (Folke et al. 2010; Thorén 2014). 
The objective of this brief section has not been to provide an exhaustive overview of the 
extant definitions of sustainability, let alone compare and scrutinize them. Instead, the only two 
aims of this section have been to acknowledge the polysemous nature of sustainability, a bromide 
detailed by others, and to recognize that sustainability is a thick concept.8 
 
2. Clarifying Our Question 
 
The concept of sustainability is polysemous. So what? Even if the polysemy of sustainability is 
fruitful for the purposes of sustainability science and scholarship, one might still ask the following 
question: what, if anything, do the main conceptions of sustainability share? Moreover, might there 
be a meta-level concept of sustainability that unifies them?9 
For the purpose of this article, clarifying the concept of sustainability amounts to adopting 
a process similar to what the German language philosopher Rudolf Carnap (1974) had in mind 
when he referred to an ‘explicative’ definition. For Carnap, an explicative definition is 
unabashedly pragmatic. It involves transforming an inexact concept, which could be an everyday 
or prescientific concept, into an exact concept. My aim is not to eliminate any of the main usages 
of ‘sustainability’ but to propose a meta-level concept that helps to explain what these usages share 
in common. We will see that the two complementary explicative definitions proposed below 
 
5 Bryan Norton (1992) coined the term “social scientific approach to sustainability.” 
6 Manufactured capital includes the traditional produced means of production, such as machines, factories, and tools; 
human capital includes items such as knowledge, technology, and institutions; and the stock of natural capital consists 
the traditional renewable and non-renewable resources, but it also denotes various non-market phenomena as well, 
including, for example, ecosystems (see DesRoches 2019a; 2019b; 2020). 
7 See Thompson (2018). 
8 For a recent overview of the various meanings assigned to the concept of sustainability, see Salas-Zapata and Ortiz-
Muñoz (2018). 
9 See Costanza and Patten (1995) for an early attempt to answer this question. 
capture the most common or essential uses of sustainability among sustainability scientists, 
including those who endorse the Brundtland Commission’s definition of ‘sustainable 
development,’ resource economists who model sustainable development, and sustainability 
scientists who conduct research on resilience and complex adaptive systems. The meta-level 
concept of sustainability on offer is general, precise, and fruitful. Moreover, it unifies sustainability 
research under a single canopy, identifies a rough division of labor among sustainability scientists 
and scholars, and makes explicit the implicit value judgments that are frequently associated with 
sustainability.   
 
3. A New Unifying Concept of Sustainability 
 
Sustainability scientists and scholars agree that the whole Earth or parts of the Earth can be 
sustainable, even if they disagree about the conditions that must be satisfied to make it so. 
Arguably, any satisfactory unifying concept of sustainability should reliably denote sustainable 
states of affairs over time – it should track the truth of states of affairs that are sustainable, much 
like a reliable thermometer tracks the truth of temperature across different environments and times. 
That said, sustainability scientists do not generally speak of ‘sustainable states of affairs’ but 
‘sustainable systems,’ such as human, natural, or hybrid human-natural systems. As a preliminary 
attempt, one might consider the following explicative definition of sustainability: 
 
Sustainable System (SS): A target system is sustainable if and only 
it persists over some time period, t1 … tn. 
 
According to SS, sustainability is a property of some systems. SS simply states that for any system 
to be sustainable it must exist over some period of time, which is to say that sustainable systems 
are intertemporal phenomena. SS is a good start but has several shortcomings. For starters, no 
system persists forever. Eventually, our sun will transform into a giant red star and consume the 
Earth in toto. Any satisfactory explicative definition of sustainability should acknowledge that a 
sustainable system persists over a finite and acceptable timeframe, even if disagreement remains 
over what is acceptable. Second, SS appears to be too general for our purposes. Why? Alpha 
Centauri qualifies as a sustainable system under SS, but no sustainability scientist worries about 
the persistence of this star system. Because the objective of this chapter is to propose an explicative 
definition of sustainability that is consilient with sustainability science, SS ought to be restricted 
to the systems conventionally targeted by sustainability scientists, such as human systems (i.e., 
economic), natural systems (i.e., ecosystems that remain relatively detached from intentional 
human agency), coupled natural and human systems, ecological-economic systems, and complex 
adaptive systems.  
Moreover, SS should be restricted for another reason: it denotes all systems that persist 
over time, but few (if any) sustainability scientists would be willing to describe a system that, for 
example, perpetuates intergenerational injustice as ‘sustainable.’ Instead, sustainability scientists 
universally agree that sustainable systems must be ‘good’ for some beings in some way, as detailed 
in Section 1. One way to capture the inherent goodness of sustainable systems is to suppose that 
they consist of a set of (non-pecuniary) goods, such as well-being, justice, and equality. While 
there might be rampant disagreement over which goods are essential to sustainability and how they 
ought to be distributed within and between generations, one thing is clear: any system worthy of 
the label ‘sustainability’ must yield them.  
Given the foregoing shortcomings of SS, one might refine the explicative definition of 
sustainability as follows: 
 
Ideal Sustainable System (ISS): A target system is ideally 
sustainable if and only if it (1) persists over some acceptable and 
finite period of time, t1 … tn, and (2) realizes a non-empty set of 
goods, Gi, for the beings worthy of moral consideration, Bi. 
 
ISS is a regulative ideal. Unlike SS, ISS is restricted to systems typically analyzed by 
contemporary sustainability scientists. Moreover, ISS acknowledges that no sustainable system 
persists forever and must yield some set of goods for those deemed worthy of moral consideration. 
While there is no consensus on the values of the main variables that constitute ISS, this explicative 
definition of sustainability serves to make explicit a set of questions, some of them philosophical, 
that are sometimes left implicit by sustainability scientists and scientists: 
 
1) Which target system? 
2) Which goods (Gi) are essential to sustainability (and how should 
they be distributed among those who deserve moral 
consideration)?  
3) Which beings (Bi) deserves moral consideration? 
4) How long must a system persist over time (t1 … tn) to qualify as 
‘sustainable’? 
 
How might sustainability scientists answer these questions, (1-4)? Consider, for example, the 
resource economists who model sustainable development. These researchers generally model the 
sustainability of an economic system as one that yields non-declining aggregate utility, a proxy for 
well-being, over time. According to such models, members of the species Homo sapiens are the 
only beings worthy of moral consideration and human well-being is, ultimately, the only relevant 
good. In this way, wittingly or unwittingly, resource economists answer questions 1-4, above. Of 
course, different sustainability scientists from different disciplines might answer these questions 
differently. Why not target an ecological-economic system as opposed to a purely economic one, 
for example? Why not insist that justice and equity, in addition to well-being, are separate and 
distinct goods that must also be realized over time? Moreover, why not maintain that all sentient 
beings (creatures capable of feeling pleasure and pain) are worthy of moral consideration, not 
merely the members of our species?  
One might reasonably object that ISS makes sustainability practically impossible to 
achieve. After all, if Gi = ‘perfect justice for all’ and ‘perfect justice for all’ is infeasible then, 
according to ISS, no system is sustainable (or could become sustainable). This conclusion is 
incompatible with the best sustainability science, which maintains that some systems are 
sustainable or, in the very least, can be made sustainable. ISS appears to set the bar too high. 
One way out of this predicament is to propose a non-ideal explicative definition of 
sustainability that complements ISS. For instance, consider the following: 
 
Non-Ideal Sustainable System (NISS): A target system is non-
ideally  sustainable if and only if it (1) persists over some acceptable 
finite period of time, t1 … tn, and (2) realizes a subset of Gi (beyond 
some minimal threshold), for a subset of beings worthy of moral 
consideration, Bi (beyond some minimal threshold). 
 
The main difference between ISS and NISS is that the former states a sustainable system requires 
Gi be realized for Bi, while the latter only requires that a subset of Gi, beyond some minimal 
threshold, be realized for a subset of Bi. Together, NISS and ISS are complementary explicative 
definitions of sustainability, neither of which is designed to be self-sufficient. They constitute a 
new meta-level concept of sustainability. While ideal sustainable systems can be difficult or 
impossible to achieve, non-ideal sustainable systems can always be improved.  
Arguably, ISS and NISS are sufficiently general to capture the main usages of 
sustainability described in Section 2. Moreover, ISS and NISS are precise and fruitful as well, 
especially because they serve to unify the concept of sustainability for sustainability science and 
scholarship under the same conceptual umbrella. Many issues remain, however. After all, ISS and 
NISS do not specify how a non-ideal sustainable system might be transformed into an ideally 
sustainable system. Sustainability scientists and scholars generally suppose that a sustainable 
system requires a corrective or intervention of some kind, whether through human action or 
omission. ISS and NISS remains neutral on this question. Perhaps a system can be made ideally 
sustainable with transformative institutions, behaviors, technologies, or social norms. But perhaps 
not. Whatever closes the gap between NISS and ISS, such factors are central to sustainability 
science and beyond the scope of this article.10  
 
4. Two Objections and Replies 
 
Let us consider two objections. First, one might object that ISS and NISS are false. After all, they 
fail to capture everything sustainability scientists and scholars do and, therefore, should be 
rejected. In response, it is critical to recognize that ISS and NISS are not designed to capture 
everything sustainability scientists do, such as accounting for every definition ever proposed by 
sustainability scientists. Instead, they are complementary and unifying definitions of sustainability 
designed to capture most sustainability science and scholarship. Any particular mismatch between 
them and actual usages of ‘sustainability’ among sustainability scientists is not a decisive objection 
against them. When judging an acceptable explicative definition, including ISS and NISS, what is 
most important is not antecedent meaning alone, but function (Gupta 2019). In this case, the 
primary function of ISS and NISS is to unify disparate definitions of sustainability under a single 
umbrella concept. Clearly, whether ISS and NISS execute this function depends crucially on the 
purpose and context for which they were designed. There may be competing explicative definitions 
of sustainability capable of unifying sustainability science and scholarship that are better than ISS 
and NISS. Such definitions should be given full consideration. Yet, simply because ISS and NISS 
do not account for every definition of sustainability, this fact does not automatically disqualify 
them as good explicative definitions (Gupta 2019). 
 The second objection is that ISS and NISS leave too many unanswered questions. After 
all, neither definition specifies, for example, the set of goods Gi essential for sustainable systems. 
Suppose that, for example, three goods – equality, justice, and human well-being – were judged to 
be essential for a system to be sustainable. Who has the authority to make this decision? What 
makes these three goods, and not others, essential to sustainable systems? What is the value of 
these goods? Are these values commensurable or incommensurable? How might one handle trade-
 
10 Such empirical matters are best left to sustainability scientists interrogating specific systems. 
offs between such non-pecuniary goods? How are these three goods to be distributed, and among 
whom? Moreover, what are ‘equality,’ ‘justice,’ and ‘well-being’? One might speak of equality 
along any number of dimensions. Equality of income, wealth, opportunity, capabilities, rights, 
treatment, resources, or something else? What is justice? Must sustainability scientists decide 
between, for example, Rawlsian and Nozickian theories of justice? If so, which theory is correct? 
If not, why not? What is human well-being? Competing philosophical theories of well-being 
include hedonism (Crisp 2006; Feldman 2004), desire satisfactionism (Heathwood 2016; Murphy 
1999), and objective-list accounts (Fletcher 2016, 2013), but there is no consensus on the correct 
theory of well-being. Does this philosophical challenge pose a problem for sustainability scientists 
who model sustainable development as non-declining human well-being over time? 
In the end, this objection confuses the central function of ISS and NISS, which is, again, 
to unify sustainability science and scholarship, not resolve substantive debates within 
sustainability science and scholarship. ISS and NISS reveal underlying philosophical (and 
scientific) questions associated with the concept of sustainability, the likes of which should be 




This chapter proposed a new concept of sustainability that, I argued, helps to unify sustainability 
science and scholarship under the same conceptual umbrella. The concept of sustainability on offer 
is constituted by two explicative definitions of sustainability, ISS and NISS. Jointly, these 
complementary definitions accommodate the central meanings assigned to sustainability and 
explain what they share. ISS and NISS also underscore a coherent division of labor among 
sustainability scientists and scholars. While many sustainability scientists construct models that 
target specific systems (with some degree of resilience), sustainability scholars, especially 
philosophers of sustainability science and environmental philosophers, address inescapable 
philosophical problems associated with the concept of sustainability. 
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